In 1935 Italy invaded Ethiopia.  Benito Mussolini, the Fascist dictator of Italy, began this conquest for a variety of reasons, some publicly expressed and others hidden until revealed by historical hindsight.  Mussolini publicly claimed that his invasion of Ethiopia was based on Italy’s “sphere of influence” rights to Ethiopia, the need to civilize the barbaric savages of Ethiopia, the economic health of Italy and her people, an expanding Italian population, and the defense of Italian interests against Ethiopian challenges.  Yet, it would be quite interesting to know what Italy’s counterparts in Europe thought about Mussolini’s many justifications for war.  Were they in agreement and support his reasoning?  Were they in disagreement and stand opposed to Mussolini?  Or were they in disagreement with his justifications but at the same time support the true reasons behind Mussolini’s conquest of Ethiopia?
            On October 3rd 1935 Italian troops, led by General De Bono, began an invasion of Abyssinia (present day Ethiopia).  This invasion was commanded by Italy’s fascist dictator Benito Mussolini who had been in control of the nation for the previous thirteen years.  The immediate cause of the war supposedly stemmed from a skirmish between Italian and Ethiopian troops some eleven months prior in November 1934.  At this time a British-Ethiopian commission was in Ethiopia seeking to formally set the boundaries between Ethiopia and both the British- and Italian-held territories of Somaliland (within the Ogaden Desert).  The point of convergence had been in debate largely because it is in this area that a vital well complex was situated (called Walwal).  When the Ethiopian troops settled their camp across from Italy’s Somali troops, tensions began to mount between the long-time rivals.  Within a month, on December 5th, after instigation by Ethiopian troops, fighting broke out between the two camps.  The Ethiopians suffered 152 casualties, 107 of which were fatal.  The Somalis suffered 130 casualties, of which 30 were fatal.  However it is important to note that no Italians were actually harmed in the Walwal Incident.
            Ethiopia’s Emperor Haile Selassie sought arbitration by the League of Nations.  Mussolini was much less willing to entertain diplomacy and six days after the incident issued an ultimatum that included an apology from Ethiopian troops at WalWal, the salute of the Italian flag by these soldiers, financial compensation, and the punishment of the responsible parties.  Despite this ultimatum which seemed to give Ethiopia an escape from further reprimand with Italian troops, Mussolini also began preparations for war.  At the same time as the ultimatum’s issuance, Il Duce sent De Bono off to Africa as the first move in his “Directive and Plan of Action for the Resolution of the Italo-Ethiopian Conflict” which essentially sought to not only destroy the Ethiopian military but also the complete subjugation of the country.
            It would appear that a declaration of war would quickly follow suit, however Mussolini held off for almost a year.  War preparations still needed to be made.  Mussolini began moving vast amounts of men and supplies to Eritrea (another Italian colony) and Italian Somaliland as well improving the area to accommodate the influx of war material and manpower.  Mussolini also began finding and training native Eritrean soldiers which he planned to combine with twice as many Italian soldiers.   In December 1934 the fascist dictator was well aware that Italy was not yet ready to secure an overwhelming victory.  This was a lesson that Italians had learned almost 40 years earlier at Adowa where on March 1st 1896 the Italian colonial  army (the most powerful in Africa at this time) – seeking to expand the Italian Empire – was humiliatingly defeated by a large Ethiopian force surrounding Adowa.  Martin Gilbert explains that “6,000 Italians were killed in a single day and the conquest of Ethiopia had to be abandoned.  Italy appeared ridiculous to imperial Europe.”   This humiliation taught Italy (and especially Mussolini) that it was much better to be over-prepared than under-prepared in manpower, weaponry, supplies, and planning.               Thus after several months of preparation, in October 1935, Mussolini was ready for war and ready to find Italy’s revenge for Adowa.  By May 1936 Italy had beaten Haile Selassie and claimed Ethiopia for the King Victor Emmanuel III of Italy.  Despite the relative shortness of the war it was in fact much more of an undertaking than Mussolini had predicted.  Gilbert points out that the “conquest of Abyssinia… proved a more complicated and more costly enterprise than (Mussolini) had imagined.” He goes on to explain that the “Abyssinians, though ill-equipped, resisted their would-be conquerors with fanatical vigor.”   Nevertheless Italy came out on top and on May 9th formally annexed Ethiopia into the Italian nation.
            Benito Mussolini was successful in his conquest of Ethiopia but history begs two questions: What drew his attention to this small African nation? and Why did he feel that Italy needed Ethiopia?  Il Duce claimed several justifications for the attack and consumption of Ethiopia including: defense, an expanding Italian population, economic necessity, civilizing the savages of Ethiopia, and an understanding with the other European powers that Ethiopia was in Italy’s sphere of influence.
            For years Italy was acknowledged as holding the sphere of influence encompassing Abyssinia.  Sir J.A.R. Marriott explains that in 1891 Britain formally recognized the country as existing within Italy’s sphere of influence and then again in 1915 when England agreed to include Italy in the repartition of Africa in the Treaty of London.   It was simply understood that Italy should be able to influence Abyssinia (as long as that influence did not threaten other European powers’ influence) and Mussolini believed that his use of the country would be in accordance with the balance of power in Europe.  Mussolini also assumed that his actions against Ethiopia would be overlooked by Britain and France because of Italy’s support against Hitler.   Mussolini was under the impression that (a) Britain and France understood Ethiopia to be under Italian influence, and (b) even if they did hold some disagreement toward his actions, his usefulness against Nazi Germany would discourage any reprimands.  David Clay Large argues that both France and Britain initially wrote off Ethiopia to Mussolini.  In 1935 France essentially traded Italy’s support of an independent Austria (against Nazi Germany) for a “free hand” in Ethiopia.  Great Britain also was more interested in preserving Austrian independence that Ethiopia’s, since the loss of the prior would be a “much more serious blow to European security.”   The January-March publication of Time in 1935 explains that “Statesman Mussolini… obtained a ‘free hand in Abyssinia’ from Britain and France who need his aid in getting Germany into the Eastern Locarno.”   Thus it would seem that Mussolini was correct in his assumption that his invasion of Ethiopia and the connection of Italy’s African colonies would not disrupt or alarm his European allies.  It would appear that Il Duce was free to turn to military and imperialist adventures in his “heroic national revival.”
            However, support for Italy intervening in Ethiopian affairs was not nearly as clearly accepted as Mussolini would have us believe.  For example, following World War I the Treaty of Versailles ignored the provisions of the Treaty of London thus denying Italian claims to African territories.  Furthermore, Ethiopia’s membership in the League of Nations meant that Italy’s actions against her would undoubtedly provoke reprimand from the League’s other members who feared another devastating war.  Despite the fact that some in Europe defended his imperialist ambitions (in hopes of preserving relations with Italy), Mussolini failed to receive the reaction he expected.  The response was largely one of public outrage, however was not accompanied by any significant successful punishment by the League of Nations.  Peter N. Stearns explains that thought the League of Nations declared Italy to be an aggressor on October 7th 1934 and began sanction actions, no serious threat existed toward Italy largely because of British and French reservations toward alienating their support against Hitler, as well as other nations’ fears of harm to their own economies.   Thus Mussolini did indeed have some support from Great Britain and France, though he failed to realize that it was not the public sort of support.  While publicly denouncing Mussolini as an aggressor, they actually did more harm to Haile Selassie’s defense of Ethiopia than to Mussolini’s attack on it.   Despite the harm done to his Ethiopian enemy, Mussolini was quite angered by his European allies’ reprimands of actions which they had themselves done in the name of imperialism.
            Ethiopia’s invasion by Italy was also claimed by Mussolini to be a civilizing mission.  Once again we see the monstrous ego of the “White Man’s Burden” rise up.  David Clay Large explains that Italy (as well as its allies) saw Ethiopians as a “benighted race of savages” living under a corrupt and brutal tyrant (Haile Selassie).   Such a mission was not new to European affairs as they had been undertaken countless times before as Europe expanded its empires through colonies.  Even Great Britain, which generally supported Ethiopia, came out on the side of Italy, not willing to sacrifice itself for black men who made up a country of “wandering gangs, disloyal Rases, anti-Christian Moslems, Arab slave traders and intriguing adventurers, who one and all did much as they liked in this remnant of medieval Africa.”   In short, Europe was unwilling to stick up for an inferior people and rather unconcerned whether or not Mussolini sought to civilize or annihilate Ethiopians.  They were not worth the loss of Italy as an ally.  However, in hindsight it is obvious that this justification was hardly more than a façade (as the devastating massive air attacks which included fire bombings and gas attacks illustrated).  However, initially Europe was unopposed to Mussolini’s civilizing mission since it fit with its historic and current view towards third world cultures.
            Mussolini also claimed economic motivations, largely the necessity of expanding Italian markets and population.  Ethiopia’s rumored mineral riches would indeed greatly improve the Italian economy, which many recognized to be faltering under fascism.  So too would the acquisition of Ethiopia bring to Italians an expanded job market to curtail the rising unemployment. Italy, like many nations, found its economy greatly distressed as the1930s dawned.  From the closing of World War I for years after Italy existed in a precarious situation…  She was a victor of the Great War, however received only impoverishment for her efforts.   The world depression led to a drastic rise in unemployment in a time when post-World War I inflation was just beginning to be stabilized.  Peter N. Stearns explains that the economic depression in Italy was “aggravated… by lack of basic raw materials and constant adverse trade balance.”  The efforts to gain control over the economy led to the “almost complete governmental control of finance and industry.”   Italy was struggling economically and Il Duce argued that by expanding her colonial possessions Italy could find relief.  Stearns goes on to point out that Ethiopia did indeed aid the Italian economy by providing it with new raw materials as well as jobs for its unemployed (some 200,000).  
            However the cost of conquering and maintaining Italy’s control of Ethiopia far exceeded the economic benefits of raw materials and a small amount of jobs.  Gaetano Salvemini argues that Ethiopia actually had far less raw materials than Mussolini insinuated.  The country produced a mere 3 percent of the world platinum, the rumored gold mines remained undiscovered (if they ever existed at all), coal and oil deposits were as common as gold mines, and even those materials which the country produces well would loose value when the cost of country-development and transportation requirements are considered.  The materials and products found in Ethiopia, Salvemini argues, are much more easily found cheaper from other countries.  Even during war, when it can be vital to have control over areas rich in raw materials, Italy’s access to these resources would be easily jeopardized by a loss of control over the vast waters that separate the two countries.  Thus, Ethiopia was more an economic liability than economic lifeline for Italy.
            Furthermore, many in Europe and abroad were far less convinced of Italy’s economic justifications than Mussolini would prefer.  First of all, the Fascist Party in Italy had for years been boasting of Italy’s economic successes and superiority.  Governments across the globe had been looking at the Italian economy for answers to their own economic shortcomings.  So, Mussolini’s claims that Ethiopia was essential to Italy’s economy were far from consistent with the popular belief of the Italian economic miracle.  Secondly, at the time of the Walwal Incident, Europe was beginning to see the truth about fascism and the Italian economy.  Despite the propaganda to the contrary, Italy’s economy was being threatened by fascist economic programs under Mussolini.  Palmer and Colton go so far as to argue that “Fascism failed to provide either the economic security or the material well-being for which it had demanded the sacrifice of individual freedom.”   They argue that not only did fascism threaten the Italian economy, it completely destabilized it.
            Prior to the depression of the late 1920s and early 1930s Italy had boasted a balanced budget along with many material improvements.  Mussolini’s economic programs were praised by other nations which sought to learn something from the dictator.  In February 1933 Foreign News reported that Mussolini “has taken to digesting balance sheets, mastering trade statistics, engineering huge combinations of Italian industry and grappling with the octopus of hard times.”   Clearly Mussolini was being heralded as the economic miracle worker.  However, Gaetano Salvemini argues that the Italians never truly had a balanced budget and those material improvements which it was so proud of failed to reach the common man in Italy.   In fact, Fascist economics had worsened the Italian economy and led the country to its “need” for foreign raw materials and jobs.  Philip Morgan explains that the Italian Fascist Party “had significant influence over the nation's economic policy. As the party became increasingly bureaucratized, it established committees which reviewed and settled labor disputes, drew up and dispensed employment contracts, and worked with employers and labor associations to implement other changes. The committees also influenced prices, incomes, trade and stock market speculation.”   Salvemini further explains that the budget was actually suffering under a large burden of hidden debts.  “The Fascist Government has carried on a considerable part of its activities, in almost every field, not by paying them out of current revenue, and not by borrowing from the public, but by promising to pay the creditors in installments extending over a period of years.”   Salvemini goes on to argue that even with the economic hardships of the Great War, the previous government had actually made significant progress economically, and that Mussolini had “inherited a financial situation which was basically sound.”  In short, the Fascist Party had spent Italy’s money (and future money) lavishly and without concern neither for the average citizen nor for the maintenance (or creation for that matter) of a sound financial system.  Thus, how could her allies openly support Italy in her search for new economic resources when she continued to misuse those she already had?  Europe was becoming increasingly aware of the poor investment reality of the Italian economy as well as the deceitful nature of the Italian Fascist Government.  New resources and jobs would not solve the failings of the Italian economy (of which many continued to believe did not exist for Italy).
            Living space was also a great claim of Mussolini when asked about his Ethiopian ambitions.  Il Duce claimed that the Italian population was growing to such an extent that the Ethiopian territory was essential for the support of his people.  Ethiopia was needed for a site to relocate Italians because with the onset of the depression several countries (including the United States, Australia, and Canada) had closed their borders to Italian emigrants (among others) for economic reasons.  Mussolini exclaimed that “Italy demands from the other Powers the recognition of her incontestable need for sun and earth” and went on to insist that “Italy must find an outlet for her ever-increasing population.” He argued that “No power has a right to stand in the way of her legitimate effort to find territories suitable for her people.  She must either expand or explode.”   And Ethiopia, which was about three times as large as Italy, seemed at first glance a more than adequate choice.  Gaetano Salvemini explains that Italy was indeed extremely dependent on foreign imports which the country purchased by: exporting Italian products and services; emigrant payments; and the revenue from tourism.   The ability to support her growing population was quite sensitive to any change in the afore-mention revenue building activities, and thus is why Mussolini argued that the conquest of Ethiopia was so vital to Italy and her people.
            However, Salvemini explains that Ethiopia was not prime real estate for Italian cultivation thanks to high altitudes and economic barriers.  He insists that most Italians would be unable to acclimate themselves to Ethiopian altitude (and climate) to find success in cultivation there.  Furthermore he points out that historically Italians have failed to seek out farms in “undeveloped and uninhabited countries” but rather prefer to “seek employment in rich countries where wages are high.”  Salvemini goes on to explain that colonial agriculture requires money (something which Italian emigrants lack) and requires much patience as profit is often delayed for years.   In fact the only way to succeed in agriculture in Ethiopia at this time would be to use native labor under the supervision and direction of Italian experts (which would defeat the purpose of finding jobs and living space for Italians). 
            Mussolini’s population justifications were actually in a great conflict with his earlier actions.  For example in 1927 Mussolini declared that there was not a population problem in Italy and that the birthrate needed to greatly increase for the welfare of the country.   Furthermore Mussolini placed several barriers before emigration (insinuating that Italy needed all the manpower available to her) including: a bar on the emigration of laborers (1925); prison time for unauthorized emigration and even the threat of death (by being shot by border guards for crossing at unauthorized points) (1926); a maximum of three year set for time spent outside the country as well as a ban on taking one’s family with you when emigrating (1927).   Thus his complaints of closed borders to Italians were proved unwarranted since he closed Italy’s borders far before other nations closed their own (for economic reasons during the depression).  Il Duce even went so far as to ban birth control in 1926.  Even taxes emulated the dictator’s efforts to expand the population.  Salvemini explains that in 1928 bachelors faced a heavy personal tax whereas large families enjoyed significant tax exemptions and privileges.   Thus it would seem that Mussolini only fabricated the claim that Italy’s population was pushing her borders and needed the safety valve that would be Ethiopia. 
            The final justification that Benito Mussolini used in his assault on Ethiopia was defense.  This was the least successful reason for war as most saw through the obvious antagonization and manipulation of Ethiopia which resembled Austria’s own treatment of Serbia twenty years earlier.  Il Duce’s defense theory stemmed from the Walwal Incident in 1934 in which Ethiopian troops began a skirmish with (Italy’s) Somali troops.  In the eleven months between this incident and Mussolini’s invasion of Ethiopia there were several smaller skirmishes at Ethiopia’s border.  However, Haile Selassie was far from in complete control of his country and its inhabitants and actually was not the source of these incidents and was usually unable to stop them.  In 1925 Robert Gale Woolbert argued that
            “Law and order, as defined in more highly developed states, does not exist in Abyssinia, especially around the periphery, far from the personal control of the Emperor.  Under normal circumstances reports of border skirmishes and acts of violence against Europeans in Abyssinia indicate not so much an increase in lawlessness or xenophobia as a desire on the part of European governments to exploit these ‘incidents’ as pretexts for bringing pressure to bear at Addis Ababa.”
            Thus it appears that both the Walwal Incident and further incidents along the Ethiopian border were simply an excuse used by a dictator with underlying imperialist ambitions.  However it is important to note that the reason why most nations and its leaders recognized the falseness of Mussolini’s defense theory was because of their own past use of such a theory in their quest for colonial expansion. 
            Despite the general disagreement with Mussolini’s public reasons for invading Ethiopia, hindsight tells us that Europe (Great Britain and France specifically) supported the dictator’s conquest of the country (at least by offering little resistance to the aggressive Italian ambitions).  Despite having alliances with Haile Selassie both Great Britain and France turned their backs on his country, allowing Mussolini to claim it for himself.  Mussolini claimed that he was acting in defense; however most nations and their leaders recognized that the offensive actions belonged to Italy.  Mussolini claimed that Italy needed more living space for its expanding population; however there was extensive evidence that argued the opposite (much of which came from Mussolini himself).  Mussolini claimed that Italy’s economy needed the raw materials and jobs that the conquest of Ethiopia would bring; however there was a growing awareness that Italy’s economic problems stemmed more from fascist economic policies than a lack of resources (not to mention that Ethiopia was a poor source of both raw materials and jobs).  Mussolini claimed that Ethiopia was ripe for a civilizing mission (of which Europe was in agreement); however hindsight shows us that he was more interested in their annihilation than salvation.  Mussolini claimed that Ethiopia was within Italy’s sphere of influence and thus his interference with the country should not be viewed as reprimandable; however (despite previous acknowledgement of Italy’s influence over the area) current circumstances prevented Europe from ignoring his aggression (for the most part).  Thus we see that Mussolini’s justifications for war were largely known to be false or mistaken; however there was a general disregard to the rights of the “uncivilized” nation of Ethiopia (in the hope of maintain positive relations with “civilized” Italy).  In short, despite lying about his real reasons to go to war, Mussolini was generally allowed to act on his ambitions of asserting Italy’s greatness and supremacy through the making of war on a largely defenseless country.